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Abstract
We explore the effects of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) personal dominance—an idiosyncratic character trait strongly 
associated with a desire for influence and control—on two fundamental organizational design decisions: the CEO’s span of 
control (1) and her delegation of responsibilities as reflected in the appointment of a chief operating officer (COO) (2). Link-
ing three original measures of CEO dominance based on quarterly earnings calls with manually collected data on span of 
control and COO positions for a sample of CEOs presiding over large US corporations, we demonstrate that CEOs who are 
high in dominance have a significantly larger personal span of control and delegate fewer decision rights than less-dominant 
CEOs. We discuss implications of our findings and future questions from an organizational design perspective.
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Introduction
An organization’s design—often not fully transparent 
to outsiders and thus eluding easy inimitability (Barney 
1991)—can be an important source of sustainable competi-
tive advantage (Aghion et al. 2014; Bloom and Van Reenen 
2010; Bloom et al. 2012; Csaszar 2012). In order to be 
effective, organizational design must, among other things, 
mitigate incentive differences between agents and the over-
all organization so that collective goals can be attained. 
This problem has long been recognized, and addressing it 
would appear challenging enough in instances when prin-
cipals can design relationships with their agents so as to 
maximize corporate profits (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Bolton 
and Dewatripont 2013; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Nyberg 
et al. 2010). However, what if the agent to whom most of the 
design is delegated, the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO), 
optimizes the organizational structure subject to her personal 
idiosyncratic preferences?
Prior research has established that a CEO’s personal-
ity manifests itself in a variety of important strategic deci-
sions (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Hambrick and Mason 1984; 
Hambrick 2007) and that CEOs’ impact on organizational 
outcomes has strongly increased over the last decades (Quig-
ley and Hambrick 2015). However, as of this writing we do 
not know whether and how organizational design decisions 
are affected by CEOs’ idiosyncratic personality traits. Moti-
vated by this lack of research and the need to better define 
the psychological underpinnings of strategy research (Flynn 
et al. 2012; Powell et al. 2011), we address this gap in our 
paper. In particular, we focus on the effect of one important 
yet hitherto underinvestigated personality trait on CEOs’ 
design decisions: dominance (Buss and Craik 1980; Cheng 
et al. 2013; Gough 1987; Wiggins 1979).
Individuals possessing a dominant personality have a 
strong desire for influence and control (e.g., Anderson and 
Kilduff 2009). Thus, dominance seems particularly prone to 
affect decisions on organizational structure. We propose that 
dominance—a latent personality trait that solidifies when 
individuals reach positions of ultimate authority (Cheng 
et al. 2010, 2013)—affects two key structural variables: span 
of control and the delegation of decision rights. In particu-
lar, we suggest that dominant CEOs will have a larger span 
of control than their nondominant peers and that dominant 
CEOs are less likely to delegate decision rights to chief 
organizational officers (COOs). Our results, obtained on a 
sample of 186 CEOs presiding over firms listed in the S&P 
500, corroborate both of our hypotheses.
Our study bears relevance for both researchers and prac-
titioners in strategy research and organizational design more 
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broadly. By providing evidence on a hitherto unexplored 
behavioral antecedent to inter-firm variation in organiza-
tional structure, we complement recent scholarship by fel-
low strategists (e.g., Csaszar 2012; Lin and Germain 2003). 
Organizational scholars more broadly may also view our 
findings as contributing to upper-echelon theory and the 
growing literature on CEO personality (see, e.g., Finkelstein 
et al. 2009; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007). 
Previous research in this area has explored the effects of 
CEO personality traits such as narcissism (e.g., Chatterjee 
and Hambrick 2007, 2011), overconfidence (Malmendier 
and Tate 2005, 2008), and temporal focus (Nadkarni and 
Chen 2014) on investment decisions. We add to this stream 
of literature by showing that a hitherto understudied CEO 
personality trait—dominance—affects even one of the most 
fundamental aspects of organizations: their formal struc-
ture. Moreover, we believe that future scholars in this area 
may benefit from our original development and validation 
of unobtrusive measures of CEO dominance in this paper. 
Finally, to management executives, our work offers a viable 
test of assessing whether current CEOs may exhibit domi-
nant behavior.
How CEOs (should) design organizations
Specialization, coordination, and optimal span 
of control
The effectiveness of organizations—systems in which dif-
ferent actors with private information and individual incen-
tives coordinate to achieve common goals (March and Simon 
1993)—increases as managers better balance the notori-
ously difficult trade-off between realizing specialization 
gains through division of labor, on one hand, and minimiz-
ing the costs of integrating effort, on the other (Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967; March and Simon 1993). Dividing labor 
encompasses partitioning of tasks and their allocation to 
members of the organization, whereas integration of effort 
speaks to the resolution of both cooperation and coordina-
tion problems (Puranam et al. 2014). Parsing tasks so that 
employees frequently repeat them engenders task-specific 
learning and creates specialization advantages (Smith 
1776). Moreover, matching individuals to tasks that they 
are better skilled to perform than others increases indepen-
dently organizational effectiveness (Lazear 2004). Foster-
ing cooperation between agents requires satisfying their 
individual utility functions, which may include pecuniary 
(Simon 1951) and nonmonetary components (Dahlander and 
O’Mahony 2011; Ostrom 1990). As regards coordination, 
most organizations resort to the use of authority or layers 
thereof—also known as hierarchies—to ensure that decision 
rights are optimally allocated within the collective, and that 
information diffuses from where it originates to where it is 
needed (Szulanski 1996; for an overview see Aghion et al. 
2014).
Hierarchies can be characterized by their depth (number 
of layers of authority) as well as their breadth (number of 
agents working at the same layer), also known as the layer’s 
span of control. Previous work has theorized extensively 
about what determines an organization’s optimal span of 
control. Williamson (1967) proposes that the degree to 
which the goals of workers and managers in the organiza-
tion are misaligned should be positively associated with a 
hierarchy’s depth and correlate negatively with optimal span. 
Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (2001) suggest that in physi-
cal-capital-intensive industries the span of control should be 
lower than in human-capital-intensive industries because the 
problems of misaligned incentives should be stronger in the 
latter. Aghion and Tirole (1997) posit that the optimal span 
of control is negatively linked to both managers’ monitor-
ing costs and the extent to which subordinates reduce their 
effort as a consequence of direct monitoring. And finally, 
extant empirical studies attest to the relevance of two fur-
ther determinants of hierarchical depth and breadth that had 
not featured as prominently in the modeling literature: firm 
size (e.g., Colombo and Delmastro 1999; Pugh et al. 1968) 
and diversification (Guadalupe et al. 2013; Rajan and Wulf 
2006).
In keeping with prior theorizing and taking stock of styl-
ized facts, one recent contribution by Lee (2014) formally 
summarizes extant conjectures about the determinants of an 
optimal span of control, while additionally suggesting that a 
manager’s skill for coordinating her subordinates will also 
affect the span of control she optimally chooses. Starting 
from the uncritical assumption that coordinating in itself 
is a skill acquired through repetition and learning, it stands 
to reason that the coordinative skills of a manager will be 
higher than those of her subordinates. Lee (2014) hence 
argues that the number of subordinates that optimally report 
directly to a manager (a.k.a. segment-specific span) should 
be proportional to (1) the number of coordination tasks that 
need to be conducted by the manager and her subordinates 
(N) and (2) the expected difference in the value contribu-
tion between the segment manager and his or her subordi-
nates (p1–p2) in helping coordinate the firm’s actions, and 
inversely proportional to (3) the marginal cost of communi-
cation the manager incurs when instructing and monitoring 
her subordinates (1).
Equation (1) not only formally summarizes prior con-
jectures on the optimality of an organization’s span of 
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suboptimal breadth in a hierarchy may originate from man-
agers’ personal predispositions and behaviors. Notably, 
Eq. (1) highlights that executives’ idiosyncratic reasons for 
having fewer or more subordinates report to them directly 
than seems efficient may result from the managers’ (exag-
gerated) perceptions of their own coordination skills as well 
as the subjectively lower communication and monitoring 
costs they incur. Such perceptions may well be driven by the 
most-senior managers’ personality traits.
CEO personality
CEOs inject much of their personality into their decisions 
and leadership behavior (Carpenter et al. 2004; Peterson 
et al. 2003; see Finkelstein et al. 2009, for a summary). 
Prior studies have established strong links between CEOs’ 
strategic decisions and their personal character traits such as 
narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 2011; Gerstner 
et al. 2013), overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 
2008), and the degree to which they allocate their attention 
between the past, present, and future—their so-called tem-
poral focus (Nadkarni and Chen, 2014). Moreover, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that these personal idiosyncrasies 
of CEOs have a mostly negative effect on organizational 
performance (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Malmendier 
and Tate 2005, 2008; for an overview see Bollaert and Petit 
2010). Within this class of potentially harmful and often 
obscure personality traits, the greatest challenge to organi-
zations is posed by those traits that may affect decisions 
over which CEOs possess a large degree of personal dis-
cretion, as related CEO actions are difficult for corporate 
stakeholders to counterbalance should it become necessary. 
CEOs’ choices pertaining to the design of the organization 
rank among the most obvious examples of such actions, as 
they are generally considered the most-senior management’s 
unique domain of responsibility. This is because structuring 
the firm to achieve optimal performance is precisely one of 
the major tasks for which a CEO is hired, and as such her 
decisions pertaining to such (re-)organizations usually go 
uncontested (e.g., Ma et al. 2015).
Asking which type of personality trait might exert the 
greatest effect on design decisions within corporations is 
structurally equivalent to asking which trait leads senior 
leaders to enjoy exaggerated control and influence over oth-
ers. Research in social psychology suggests that one per-
sonality trait stands out from all the others in that regard: 
dominance (see Anderson and Kilduff 2009, for an over-
view).1 Dominance is defined as the “tendency to behave 
in assertive, forceful, and self-assured ways; it is the desire 
for control and influence” (Cheng et al. 2013, p. 106). Prior 
research has demonstrated that individuals with dominant 
personalities exhibit a desire to control and influence their 
environment (Murray 1938) and display this behavior in 
a variety of settings (Buss and Craik 1980; Emmons and 
McAdams 1991; Gough 1987; Wiggins 1979). It is a clearly 
established empirical finding that individuals who are more 
dominant seek and attain high levels of influence in organi-
zations (e.g., Maner and Mead 2010). This strongly sug-
gests that trait dominance will be prevalent in CEOs (e.g., 
Anderson and Kilduff 2009). That being said, this research 
also suggests that not every leader in an organization is high 
in trait dominance, and that leaders in positions of power 
differ substantially from one another in their will to control 
and influence subordinates (Anderson and Kilduff 2009; 
Cheng et al. 2010; Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Maner and 
Mead 2010, 2012; Van Vugt 2006). More recently, scholars 
in social psychology have focused on examining how domi-
nant personalities attain power in organizations and iden-
tify dominance as a fundamental strategy of leaders to gain 
and maintain power (Anderson and Kilduff 2009; Cheng 
et al. 2010, 2013; Johnson et al. 2012; Maner 2016). CEOs 
high in trait dominance want to keep their power over oth-
ers once they reach the pinnacle of the hierarchy (Cheng 
et al. 2013; Henrich and Gil-White 2001; Maner and Mead 
2010, 2012). Therefore, this line of research emphasizes that 
dominance influences the strategic means individuals use to 
attain and maintain control (e.g., Cheng et al. 2013). The fact 
that dominant CEOs are highly motivated to establish and 
maintain their power over others (Maner and Mead 2012) 
influences their preferences for strategic actions and, thus, 
suggests important implications for organizational design 
decisions. Interestingly, while scholars have empirically 
studied dominance in leaders in adjacent disciplines such as 
in the political sciences (Ferguson and Barth 2002; Hermann 
1980; Winter 2003, 2005), there is as of today no research 
in management connecting dominance with organizational 
outcomes.
1 Dominance is central concept in understanding the behavior of 
humans and other species and, therefore, has been studied exten-
sively, for over 75 years, from many different perspectives. For exam-
ple, ethologists study dominance by observing whether animals gain 
scarce resources over other animals (Alcock, 1989); socio-biologists 
examine testosterone levels of nonhuman primates and show that 
dominance in chimpanzees, for example, leads to higher rank within 
the hierarchy and greater reproductive success (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; 
Ellis, 1995); sociologists use the term to describe dominant relation-
ships from certain social groups over others (Dreher and Gassebner, 
2008; Patil, 2002); and evolutionary psychologists see dominance as 
a fundamental behavioral strategy to obtain high rank in human hier-
archies (e.g., Maner and Mead, 2010; Mead and Maner, 2012; Van 
Vugt, 2006; Van Vugt, Hogan, and Kaiser, 2008). Despite the variety 
of terminology used in different streams of literature, there is a broad 
consensus among scholars on the existence of a particular behavioral 
system that triggers dominant behavior with the goal of having con-
trol and influence over material sources (Johnson et al., 2012).
Footnote 1 (continued)
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The effect of CEO dominance on organizational 
design
As described, the primary “function” of dominant personali-
ties is to establish and maintain control and influence in set-
tings with other people (Gough et al. 1951; Horowitz et al. 
2006; Wiggins 1979). We thus argue that dominant CEOs 
will act strategically in their organizational design decisions 
to establish as much control as possible and protect their 
powerful position in the face of threats to their ability to 
control others. Bridging the aforementioned literatures and 
extending prior arguments on the effects of dominance on 
control and influence, we suggest that dominant CEOs will 
adjust two key organizational structure variables (Colombo 
and Delmastro 2008): span of control (1) and the appoint-
ment of a COO (2).
Specifically, in line with prior work (Rajan and Wulf 
2006; Wulf 2012), which argued that increased CEO 
involvement and control is strongly associated with a larger 
span of control, it would appear that one way for CEOs to 
satisfy their desire for control and influence is to unduly 
increase the span of control beyond what would be con-
sidered an otherwise optimal level. Importantly, having a 
wider span of control satisfies the dominant CEOs desire to 
control and influence more subordinates. By having more 
subordinates dominant CEOs are more involved with their 
executive team and have a larger number of coordination 
tasks to fulfill. This is also in line with research showing 
that CEOs with a wider span of control spend a larger share 
of their time interacting with their management team (e.g., 
Bandiera et al. 2014). At the same time, a wider span of 
control makes it easier for the CEO to control and monitor 
the direct reports and thus protect their powerful position, 
as compared to a lower span that might give rise to few 
powerful executives. Based on this reasoning we posit the 
following:
Hypothesis 1: Dominant CEOs will, all else being equal, 
have a wider span of control than less-dominant CEOs.
Importantly, modifying the breadth of the second man-
agement layer may not be the only way for a CEO to assuage 
her need for control. In particular, a dominant CEO should 
be less willing to delegate decision-making authority in 
ways that would reduce her opportunities to engage in 
direct instructions and monitoring. As a consequence, CEOs 
should be less willing to appoint a COO to the top man-
agement team, as the COO position explicitly takes away 
responsibilities for many business decisions from the CEO 
and decentralizes decision-making (Hambrick and Cannella 
2004; Marcel 2009; Zhang 2006). For example, Hambrick 
and Canella (2004) analyze the determinants of a COO and 
argue that the presence of the position significantly changes 
the nature of the CEO’s job, since it allows them to delegate 
internal operating matters and focus more intensively on 
external and strategic activities. As Hambrick and Cannella 
(2004) posit: “the decision to have a COO represents a major 
structural choice: it explicitly divides between two people a 
set of top level roles that are typically fulfilled by one per-
son; it draws a structural distinction between strategy formu-
lation and implementation”. (p. 198). Importantly, research 
also posits that the responsibilities which are overtaken by 
the COO mainly include the coordination of employees 
(Hambrick and Cannella 2004; Marcel 2009). This line of 
reasoning is also consistent with research from Bandiera 
et al. (2014) which shows that the position of a COO nega-
tively affects the time CEOs spent in interactions and meet-
ings with their subordinates which decreases the opportunity 
to control them. We therefore propose the following:
Hypothesis 2: Dominant CEOs will, all else being equal, 
be less likely to have a COO on their top management team 
than less-dominant CEOs.
Naturally, both the span of control and the appointment of 
COOs may be also affected by other determinants, including 
dominance-unrelated characteristics of the CEO. Disentan-
gling these effects from dominance-related effects does not 
affect the validity of our theoretical arguments, but repre-
sents an empirical challenge, which we address below.
Data
Empirical setting and data collection
Our sample to assess the relationship between organizational 
structure and CEO dominance consists of CEOs who pre-
sided over the 250 largest (by market capitalization) compa-
nies in the S&P 500 index in 2014.
We collected data on each CEO’s span of control and 
the existence of a COO position for 2014 from a private 
consulting company called Alta Data.2 In 17 cases, data on 
either span of control or COOs were not available, reducing 
our sample to 233 observations. We then merged these data 
with information on firm financials and CEO characteristics 
which we obtained from Compustat and Execucomp, respec-
tively. To control for succession effects (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick 2007, 2011; Gerstner et al. 2013; Petrenko et al. 
2015), we dropped 12 observations in which the CEO in the 
year 2014 had only been in office for one year. Moreover, 
2 Note that the choice of the year 2014 is largely constrained by the 
availability of span of control and COO appointment data that are not 
accessible for prior years.
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we removed 13 observations in which data on CEO charac-
teristics from Execucomp was not available, leaving us with 
208 data points. We then collected all available earnings 
calls in which the 208 CEOs had participated between 2010 
and 2013 from Thomson One. In 22 cases, no earnings calls 
were available. Removing those observations left us with our 
final sample of 186 cross-sectional observations for which 
complete information exists about (1) the CEO’s span of 
control in 2014, (2) the presence of a COO in 2014 (or lack 
thereof), (3) the CEO’s trait dominance, and (4) firm and 
industry characteristics for the year 2013.
One concern with our described sample may be that 
our sample shows selective features that hamper inference 
beyond the 186 cases we examined in detail. In an attempt 
to rule out that our sample differed from the otherwise 
widely established S&P 1500 population, we ran simple 
t-test comparisons (our sample vs. the entirety of the S&P 
1500) for those variables deployed in our study which could 
easily be computed for all CEOs of the largest 1500 firms 
in the United States. Results indicate that that there is no 
significant difference between the ages of CEOs in our 
sample and the rest of the S&P 1500 population (t = 0.115; 
p = 0.909); furthermore, there is also no significant differ-
ence in the ratio of female to male CEOs between the two 
samples (t =  − 0.023; p = 0.982). There, however, is a sig-
nificant difference in CEO-tenure between the two groups, 
with CEOs in our sample having a shorter tenure (t = 3.505; 
p = 0.001) and receiving on average higher compensation 
than the CEOs of the rest of the S&P 1500 (t =  − 18.72; 
p = 0.000). Moreover, a joint logit specification on whether 
a firm enters our sample (1: yes; 0: otherwise) based on a 
set of these variables suggests that of the four variables, 
CEO-compensation (p = 0.000) and tenure (p = 0.003) sig-
nificantly predict whether a firm enters our sample.
Dependent variables
Obtaining large-scale cross-sectional data on the organiza-
tional structure of firms is a notoriously difficult endeavor, 
which in the past often led to a focus on small-scale, in-
depth studies (Baker et al. 1994). More recently, authors 
have begun to deploy survey data collected from consulting 
companies that capture detailed information on job descrip-
tions, titles, and reporting relationships within firms (Gua-
dalupe and Wulf 2010; Rajan and Wulf 2006). In this paper, 
we follow this latter approach and rely on manually collected 
data from a private company, Alta Data, that specializes in 
gathering and verifying detailed information on reporting 
relationships within firms. Thus, our data have an advantage 
in that we do not have to rely solely on job titles to iden-
tify our dependent variables, but instead have information 
on actual reporting relationships between executives when 
measuring our dependent variables. Moreover, all reporting 
relationships were manually verified by Alta Data employ-
ees, and our data are thus considerably more reliable than 
information from other sources such as organigrams or job 
titles. Drawing on Alta Data’s reporting-relationship data for 
2014, we construct two dependent variables. First, we meas-
ure the span of control as the number of persons directly 
reporting to the CEO. Second, we code whether a COO was 
present (1; 0 otherwise).
Independent variables
Measurement of dominance
Two approaches to measuring dominance in individuals have 
been repeatedly deployed in the past: (1) using surveys with 
dominance scales to be filled out by the individuals them-
selves (Wiggins 1979; Cheng et al. 2010), and (2) computing 
unobtrusive measures based on observing a person’s com-
munication style (e.g., Burgoon et al. 1998; Norton 1983). 
Sending questionnaires to top managers often comes at the 
expense of low response rates (Anseel et al. 2010). More-
over, questions about sensitive issues—such as dominant 
behavior—typically yield particularly not very high response 
rate (Cycyota and Harrison 2006), and answers of the man-
agers are often influenced by a social desirability bias (Chat-
terjee and Hambrick 2007, 2011; Hirsch and Pozner 2005). 
As a consequence of these limitations, unobtrusive measure-
ment approaches such as observing a CEO’s communica-
tion style have become the norm in research on executive 
psychology (Carpenter et al. 2004; Finkelstein et al. 2009; 
Hill et al. 2014). Following the latter approach, we measure 
CEOs’ trait dominance based on observing their communi-
cation style during quarterly earnings calls.
Earnings calls
Earnings calls have two parts: (1) the presentation section, in 
which the CEO and other executives describe company per-
formance and strategy; and (2) the Q&A section, in which 
managers of the firm and analysts engage in a question-and-
answer format (Kimbrough 2005). Earnings calls are an 
essential form of communication between top management 
and capital providers (Li et al. 2009), and almost all large 
public companies use them as an inexpensive information 
platform (Bushee et al. 2003). We argue that earnings calls 
are an excellent source of information for measuring domi-
nance in CEOs, for several reasons. First, during earnings 
calls, managers’ report the strategy and performance of their 
company in a question-and-answer format with analysts 
(Kimbrough 2005; Li et al. 2009), and it is therefore easy to 
observe how often a CEO seizes control of the conversation. 
Second, earnings calls are an important source of informa-
tion for analysts and investors (Bushee et al. 2003, 2004; 
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Mayew 2008; Li et al. 2009; Mohr and Schumacher 2019), 
so they provide rich repositories of information exchange. 
Third, other than letters to shareholders, media reports, or 
interviews, earnings calls also avoid the (legitimate) criti-
cism that much of the recorded information might not be 
attributable to the CEO herself. Fourth, earnings calls have 
the advantage of generally following a consistent sched-
ule across companies: an opening statement by the CEO 
of the company followed by a question-and-answer session 
between senior executives and analysts facilitates interor-
ganizational comparison (Li et al. 2009). We downloaded 
the quarterly earning call transcripts from Thomson One. 
Next we parsed the text and identified the date of each call 
and the ticker symbol and name of each firm using a C# 
computer program written for this purpose. We used the 
consistent format of earnings calls to split the earnings calls 
into three parts: (1) the cover, the corporate participants, and 
the conference call participants; (2) the presentation section; 
and (3) the Q&A section. We parsed the first part to exam-
ine the name and title of the earnings call participants. We 
then determined the exact number of words spoken and how 
many times a person spoke in the earning call—accordingly 
for each participant for each of the respective parts. In a final 
step, we extracted the specific language of each participant. 
This allowed us to perform content analysis (Pennebaker 
et al. 2003) on the CEO-specific language using LIWC.
To code our independent variable, we follow the approach 
by Norton (1983),3 who argues that dominance can be meas-
ured by observing three typical behaviors in a persons’ ver-
bal interactions: (1) monopolization of the talk, as reflected 
in a person talking for long periods and not letting others 
talk; (2) involvement in the talk, as reflected in the person’s 
lack of hesitation to speak up and not letting others start a 
conversation; (3) forcefulness, as reflected in the individual’s 
coming across as strong and talking assertively. We derived 
one measure for each of these categories in the following 
way.
Dominance 1—monopolization Dominant personalities 
talk often, for long periods, and do not let others talk (Nor-
ton 1983). Several studies use the amount of speech as one 
dimension of their measures (Aries et al. 1983; Kimble and 
Musgrove 1988; Mehrabian 1969) and show that dominant 
persons indeed talk for more time than others (Anderson and 
Kilduff 2009; Judge et al. 2002). Thus, we measured this 
tendency of CEOs to monopolize the conversation as the 
number of words a CEO speaks in the presentation section 
in relation to total words spoken during the presentation 
section.
Dominance 2—involvement Our second measure reflects the 
tendency of dominant individuals to neither hesitate to speak 
up nor to let others start conversations. Following research 
showing that dominant personalities express their opinions 
more frequently (Kalma et al. 1993; Moskowitz 1990), we 
measure this as the number of times a CEO seizes the con-
versation during the Q&A earnings call (CEO takeover) over 
the total number of times any participant speaks during the 
Q&A section.
.
Dominance 3—assertiveness This measure reflects the extent 
to which a CEO speaks assertively or forcefully during the 
calls. Especially more recent research focuses on the asser-
tive dimension of dominant behavior (Cheng et al. 2013), 
but also prior research shows that dominant personalities 
speak more assertively (Aries et al. 1983). We measure this 
as the inverse of the CEO’s takeovers during the Q&A sec-
tion and the total use of polite words in the Q&A section. 
We measured the use of polite words using content analy-
sis with the LIWC software and included the words please, 
thank, thanks.
We aggregate all measures to the CEO level across all 
earnings calls she was involved with. As such, our meas-
ure of dominance is time invariant, purposefully reflecting 
theoretical claims that dominant behavior should be a stable 
personal disposition.4 For each of our three core independent 
measures, we first take the logarithm and then standardize its 
value. Our analysis is based on 974 transcripts of earnings 
calls in which the 186 CEOs in our sample took part between 









Number polite Words CEO
3 Latter studies have repeatedly studied the three categories of Nor-
ton’s approach: dominant persons indeed talk for more time than 
others (Anderson and Kilduff, 2009; Judge et al., 2002), more often 
express their opinions (Kalma, Visser, and Peeters, 1993; Moskow-
itz, 1990; Anderson and Kilduff, 2009), and speak in a more assertive 
tone (Aries, Gold, and Weigel, 1983; Anderson and Kilduff, 2009).
4 We also keep with prior work on executive personalities (Chatter-
jee and Hambrick, 2007, 2011; Gerstner et al., 2013; Petrenko et al., 
2015; Zhu and Chen, 2014) relying on time-invariant measures when 
capturing CEO personality traits.
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Control variables
We deploy a series of controls at various levels of analysis.
CEO controls We controlled for CEO-age and CEO-ten-
ure and CEO-gender. Given that CEOs with larger structural 
power could have greater discretion (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) we also control for structural power (Finkelstein, 
1992) by (1) capturing if the CEO was also chairman of the 
board, CEO-COBt−1 , and (2) by teasing out variance attrib-
utable to the ratio of CEO-compensation to the total com-
pensation of the top management team, CEO-compensation 
(Ridge et al. 2015).
Earnings call controls We controlled for the total number 
of earnings calls that were available for each CEO, Number 
EC, and the average number of top managers who partici-
pated in the earnings calls, Participants EC.
Firm and industry controls Prior research showed that 
one key determinant of organizational structure is firm size 
(Collins et al. 1999; Colombo and Delmastro 1999; Pugh 
et al. 1968). We thus add the natural logarithm of total 
assets of a firm’s, Size, as a control variable in our regres-
sions.5 In addition, we also included three-digit SIC-code 
dummies to control for industry effects. Finally, given that 
recent research (Guadalupe et al. 2013) suggests that a firm’s 
level of diversification has a positive effect on the number of 
executives reporting directly to the CEO, we also control for 
diversification using a modified Herfindahl index (Amit and 
Livnat 1988) in our regressions, Diversification.6
Lastly, we also controlled if a specific firm met the earn-
ings forecasts, which could in turn affect if the CEO engages 
in impression management in the earnings calls (e.g., Hay-
ward and Fitza 2017). Specifically, we collected earnings 
forecasts from the IBES database (see e.g., Bloom et al. 
2004 for more details) and coded with a binary indicator if 
the forecasts were missed or not: Missed earnings forecast. 
Furthermore, as a second complimentary control we coded a 
variable if a firm was above or below their performance aspi-
ration level. Specifically, following prior work (e.g., Bromi-
ley 1991; Miller and Chen 2004; Chen and Miller 2007; Lim 
and McCann 2014), we employed return on assets (ROA) 
as our main measure of firm performance. We follow prior 
research and computed a firm’s historical aspiration level as 
the firm’s ROA in the previous year. We then derived each 
firm’s performance feedback as the difference between the 
firm’s actual performance and its respective aspiration level 
(e.g., Schumacher et al. 2020). This procedure resulted in 
two control variables: positive performance feedback and 
negative performance feedback.
Model and estimation
To test our hypotheses concerning the link between organi-
zational structure and dominance, we use the following base-
line specification:
where i denotes the firm and t denotes time. Dominance is 
one of our three measures of dominance, and w�
it−1
 is a vector 
of all controls. We follow prior literature and use a lagged 
design, to account for the fact that structural changes require 
time to manifest themselves (Acemoglu et al. 2007; Chatter-
jee and Hambrick 2007; Gerstner et al. 2013; Petrenko et al. 
2015). Therefore, all right-hand-side variables refer to 2013, 
whereas the dependent variables are for 2014. Our depend-
ent variable is either span of control or COO appointment.
Results
Table 1 presents means, standard deviations, and correla-
tions for all our variables. Our data for span of control and 
COO appointments are similar to those in other studies 
examining structural organizational variables. For example, 
Guadalupe et al. (2013) report an increasing trend in the 
span of control over the last decades and find a mean of 9.8 
for the year 2008, which is comparable to our value of 10.7 
for the year 2014. In yet a different study, Zhang (2006) 
reported that 28% of firms in his sample employed a COO, 
the same value we found for our sample. Similarly, our vari-
ables derived from earnings calls—the mean values for total 
words and references per earnings call—are comparable to 
those in recent studies using earnings calls from large Amer-
ican firms (Mayew 2008; Li et al. 2009; Mohr and Schu-
macher 2019). Correlations appear to be small to moderate 
between most variables, except for the word and reference 
counts that constitute our three dominance measures.7
Table 2 reports the results for Hypothesis 1, which pos-
ited that CEO dominance would be positively related to 
span of control. We first test each of our three dominance 
measures separately across three different specifications. 
In addition, we test for joint significance of the measures 
within both OLS and Poisson estimations and furthermore 
test our predictions, in order to eliminate time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity, through fixed-effects analysis 




5 Note that alternative firm-size measures (total revenues and total 
employees) led to no change in our results.
6 We compute the measure following the standard procedure by Amit 








2 where sj is the share of a 
firm´s total sales to the jth SIC industry group.
7 We further address resulting issues below when interpreting our 
regression results.
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on auxiliary panel data. Overall, our findings support 
our hypothesis. We find a significantly positive effect of 
dominance on span of control when deploying our sin-
gle measures Dominance1 (  = 0.751; p = 0.029;  CI95% 
[0.060, 1.421]) and Dominance2 (  = 0.725, p = 0.028 
 CI95% [0.072, 1.366]) but just a weakly significant support 
for our Dominance3 measure (  = 0.952; p = 0.095;  CI95% 
[0.051, 2.039]). Importantly, when testing for joint sig-
nificance of our three measures, we obtain a significantly 
positive effect, OLS (p = 0.029) and Poisson (p = 0.020). 
Table 2  Span of control as a 
function of CEO dominance
Robust pval in parentheses
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dominance 1 0.751 0.132 0.010
(0.029) (0.845) (0.843)
Dominance 2 0.725 0.447 0.049
(0.028) (0.471) (0.272)
Dominance 3 0.952 0.764 0.071
(0.095) (0.161) (0.035)
Joint significance - 3.14
F(3, 165) (0.029)
Joint significance - 9.88
chi2(3) (0.02)
Participants EC 0.071 0.399 0.248 0.189 0.419 0.041
(0.819) (0.197) (0.442) (0.548) (0.170) (0.040)
Number EC 0.033 − 0.017 0.022 − 0.060 − 0.090 − 0.009
(0.842) (0.907) (0.887) (0.665) (0.487) (0.291)
CEO-age − 0.037 − 0.061 − 0.056 − 0.030 − 0.054 − 0.005
(0.650) (0.457) (0.488) (0.715) (0.520) (0.385)
CEO-gender 1.298 1.238 0.981 2.147 2.057 0.201
(0.598) (0.613) (0.685) (0.367) (0.382) (0.234)
CEO-COB 0.183 0.242 0.328 0.484 0.550 0.055
(0.781) (0.704) (0.609) (0.475) (0.411) (0.226)
CEO-tenure 0.037 0.076 0.069 0.039 0.082 0.008
(0.672) (0.321) (0.385) (0.641) (0.289) (0.166)
CEO-compensation − 0.060 − 0.066 − 0.084 − 0.039 − 0.040 − 0.003
(0.700) (0.679) (0.599) (0.806) (0.805) (0.794)
Firm size 0.913 1.091 0.951 0.962 1.111 0.101
(0.028) (0.007) (0.021) (0.020) (0.006) (0.000)
Firm diversification 1.720 1.176 1.289 1.606 1.266 0.123
(0.232) (0.413) (0.358) (0.273) (0.395) (0.253)
Positive performance feedback − 3.529 − 7.499 − 0.710 − 9.831 − 11.711 − 1.131
(0.836) (0.654) (0.967) (0.580) (0.499) (0.343)
Negative performance feedback − 12.800 − 13.518 − 14.034 − 16.269 − 16.969 − 1.565
(0.572) (0.550) (0.514) (0.489) (0.472) (0.256)
Missed earnings forecast 0.083 − 0.087 0.189 0.098 − 0.150 − 0.012
(0.912) (0.894) (0.792) (0.891) (0.817) (0.776)
Constant 1.871 0.504 1.882 1.039 0.105 1.401
(0.784) (0.941) (0.783) (0.883) (0.988) (0.003)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 186 186 186 186 186 186
R-squared 0.497 0.563 0.542 0.548 0.588 −
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The separate insignificance of the dominance measures 
in the joint specification is attributable to the high levels 
of correlations between the three measures, which dis-
guises the differential contributions of the three measures 
in Models 2.5 and 2.6.8 That said, the overall explanatory 
power of our models increases when including all meas-
ures for Dominance in parallel, even when adjusting for 
the lower degrees of freedom, suggesting that our three 
measures all imperfectly but distinctly differently capture 
parts of the dominance-related variance.
Table 3 presents the results of our test of Hypothesis 2 
suggesting that dominant CEOs will be less likely to employ 
a COO. Again, we test each of our three dominance meas-
ures individually and jointly. As suggested by Hypothesis 
2, we find a significantly negative effect on the probability 
Table 3  COO appointment as a 
function of CEO dominance
Robust p val in parentheses
Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dominance 1 − 0.564 0.132
(0.029) (0.845)
Dominance 2 − 0.608 0.447
(0.015) (0.471)
Dominance 3 − 0.411 0.764
(0.269) (0.161)
Joint significance - 8.71
Chi2(3) (0.038)
Participants EC 0.150 − 0.054 − 0.034 0.083 − 0.076
(0.492) (0.803) (0.874) (0.724) (0.750)
Number EC 0.040 0.060 0.056 0.092 0.085
(0.643) (0.512) (0.537) (0.336) (0.388)
CEO-age − 0.019 0.000 0.002 − 0.020 − 0.001
(0.702) (0.996) (0.973) (0.692) (0.991)
CEO-gender 0.239 0.897 0.869 0.173 0.810
(0.866) (0.577) (0.586) (0.910) (0.626)
CEO-COB − 0.296 − 0.344 − 0.415 − 0.463 − 0.515
(0.506) (0.446) (0.367) (0.314) (0.276)
CEO-tenure 0.159 0.143 0.134 0.161 0.139
(0.012) (0.017) (0.029) (0.009) (0.023)
CEO-compensation − 0.068 − 0.032 − 0.029 − 0.076 − 0.037
(0.589) (0.806) (0.822) (0.543) (0.780)
Firm size − 0.146 − 0.257 − 0.230 − 0.130 − 0.232
(0.627) (0.424) (0.477) (0.677) (0.489)
Firm diversification 0.229 0.595 0.578 0.313 0.573
(0.839) (0.612) (0.641) (0.783) (0.635)
Positive performance feedback − 7.235 − 9.269 − 11.232 − 4.897 − 8.967
(0.569) (0.469) (0.377) (0.690) (0.492)
Negative performance feedback 4.355 4.183 5.111 3.117 2.732
(0.712) (0.731) (0.651) (0.781) (0.800)
Missed earnings forecast 0.369 0.244 0.238 0.397 0.298
(0.404) (0.597) (0.619) (0.384) (0.539)
Constant − 0.109 0.470 0.094 − 0.432 0.150
(0.982) (0.924) (0.985) (0.928) (0.976)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 147 147 147 147 147
8 Computing variance inflation factors for Dominance1 (4.73), 
Dominance2 (4.49), and Dominance3 (3.38) in our joint specification 
suggests that the contribution of the three distinct measures cannot 
be discerned—an issue we are not primarily concerned with in this 
paper, however, as we are predominantly concerned with joint signifi-
cance.
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that a CEO has a COO on her top management team for the 
single measures Dominance1 ( = − 0.564; p = 0.029;  CI95% 
[− 1.068, − 0.059]) and Dominance2 ( = − 0.608; p = 0.015; 
 CI95% [− 1.098, − 0.117]). There was no significant effect 
for our Dominance3 measure ( β= − 0.411; p = 0.269;  CI95% 
[− 1.140, 0.318]). More importantly, again all three meas-
ures jointly contribute to explaining COO appointments 
(p = 0.038).
Discussion of results and exclusion of alternative 
explanations
In the following, we discuss several possible concerns 
regarding the validity of our findings and provide addi-
tional empirical evidence which we collected to address 
these issues.
Eliminating time‑invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
through fixed‑effects analysis on auxiliary panel data.
First, similar to other studies examining the relationship 
between personality traits and firm-level effects (e.g., Chat-
terjee and Hambrick 2007; Gerstner et al. 2013; Petrenko 
et al. 2015), our core tests above were carried out on cross-
sectional data. Considering the time-invariant nature of per-
sonality traits, such an approach seems reasonable, particu-
larly when dependent measures are not readily available over 
time as in our case. That said, such an analysis stops short of 
eliminating time-invariant heterogeneity at the level of the 
organization. To tackle the latter problem and to corroborate 
our cross-sectional findings, we thus compiled an auxiliary 
panel dataset of SP500 firms in the period of 2002–2014 that 
would allow us to estimate firm-level fixed effects. To that 
end, we downloaded additional 22,000 quarterly earning call 
transcripts compiled from January 2002 to December 2014 
provided by Thomson One for measuring dominance. We 
then matched our data with the Compustat and Execucomp 
databases, from which we drew our dependent variables and 
controls. Due to missing data in both databases, this pro-
cess yielded a sample constituting complete data for 5,284 
firm-year observations by 456 firms and 918 CEOs with an 
average of 6.92 years per firm. Importantly, to compensate 
for the lack of precise span-of-control information pertaining 
to the years prior to 2014 (when predecessor CEOs were in 
office), we computed an auxiliary dependent variable to test 
Hypothesis 1; notably, we measured the size of the top man-
agement teams (TMT) that current and predecessor CEOs 
had assembled around them—following coding procedures 
laid out in earlier works (e.g., Wiersema and Bantel 1992).
To assess the viability of using TMT Size as an alterna-
tive dependent variable to test H1, we correlated our TMT 
Size measure for 2014 with the span-of-control variable 
for the same year, and we obtained encouraging results 
(r = 0.69, p = 0.000). Moreover, to test Hypothesis 2, we 
collected additional information on COO appointments for 
each CEO in our sample. Adhering to our earlier estimation 
strategy (notably the lagged design), but exploiting the addi-
tional variation over time, we finally estimated a series of 
different models on the above-described panel data. Table 4 
summarizes the results.
Paramaterizations 4.1 through 4.4 model TMT Size 
as a function of different CEO dominance measures, 
controls, and firm fixed effects. Models 4.5 through 4.8 
present counterpart estimations for the dependent vari-
able COO appointment. As can be seen from Table 4, the 
panel estimations support our cross-sectional findings in 
Table 4  Fixed-effects 
estimation with TMT size and 
presence of COO as dependent 
variables
Robust p val in parentheses
* 251 groups dropped because of all positive or all negative outcomes
DV TMT TMT TMT TMT COO COO COO COO
OLS OLS OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit Logit
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Dominance 1 0.043 0.016 − 0.271 − 0.226
(0.030) (0.433) (0.000) (0.000)
Dominance 2 0.109 0.093 − 0.237 − 0.135
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.075)
Dominance 3 0.065 0.027 − 0.191 − 0.098
(0.003) (0.209) (0.004) (0.179)
Joint F-test 6.12
(p-values) (0.018)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5284 5284 5284 5284 2587* 2587 2587 2587
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that coefficient estimates for our core independent varia-
bles—the dominance measures—point in the hypothesized 
directions and show statistical significance. It is the con-
vergence of results across Tables 2, 3, and 4 that makes us 
confident overall that CEO dominance truly exhibits the 
hypothesized effects. We use our panel dataset also in the 
next analysis to further tackle endogeneity concerns of 
our analysis.
Endogeneity control One important remaining concern is 
that our estimates could be biased due to the sorting of domi-
nant CEOs in companies with certain organizational struc-
ture characteristics. In particular, prior research suggests 
that executives with certain attributes may be specifically 
attracted to and hired by firms where these characteristics are 
considered desirable due to the firm’s specific circumstances 
(e.g., Schneider 1987).
To address such concerns, we followed prior research 
(Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 2011), and controlled for 
the possible case that dominant CEOs are drawn to certain 
situations. To do this, we run a regression of our dominance 
measure on a set of contemporaneous and antecedent vari-
ables. The antecedent variables were observed in the year 
before the CEO entered the office and included the calendar 
year, the performance, size and diversification of the firm, 
and change in performance. The contemporaneous vari-
ables were measured one year after the CEO’s entry. These 
variables included CEO-age, CEO was also chairman of the 
board, and CEO ownership. Additionally, we coded using 
the database BoardEx whether the CEO was internally hired 
or not.
Of these variables, none significantly predicted our 
measures of CEO Dominance1 and Dominance2 and just 
change in performance weakly significant predicted our 
CEO Dominance 3 measure. When we included the pre-
dicted dominance scores as controls in our regressions all 
of our main results remained significant: Dominance1 and 
TMT size (  = 0.044; p = 0.030;  CI95% [0.004, 0.082]) and 
COO (  = − 0.270; p = 0.000;  CI95% [− 0.390, − 0.151]); 
Dominance2 and TMT size (  = 0.108; p = 0.000;  CI95% 
[0.058, 0.159]) and COO (  = − 0.237; p = 0.000;  CI95% 
[− 0.370, − 0.104]); and lastly, Dominance3 and TMT size 
(  = 0.064; p = 0.003;  CI95% [0.022, 0.107]) and COO (  = 
− 0.190; p = 0.004;  CI95% [− 0.321, − 0.059]).
In sum, our additional analysis suggests that endogeneity 
due to sorting was not a main driver of our results. Yet, we 
also note that other research designs might be even more 
effective in addressing such concerns.
Operationalization and measurement validity Third, one 
might challenge the validity of our original unobtrusive 
measures in two ways. On one hand (a), one may wonder 
whether the measures reflect characteristics of the individual 
CEO or of the firm. On the other hand (b), one may question 
whether our measures truly capture dominance in CEOs or 
some other qualities. We conducted several tests to address 
both concerns.
If a company had institutionalized how a CEO should 
behave during an earnings call, then this ingrained corpo-
rate practices might make a CEO appear (non-)dominant 
and bias our findings. To assess whether our measures 
were mostly driven by factors related to the CEOs or 
instead to their firms, we followed Chatterjee and Ham-
brick (2007) and initially calculated for every predeces-
sor of the CEOs in our sample—for which earnings calls 
on Thomson One were available—Dominance measures 
1 and 2. This procedure yielded 110 CEO predecessor–
successor pairs. The dominance scores for the succes-
sive CEOs showed considerable inconsistency (r = 0.09; 
p = 0.352 for Dominance1; r = 0.043; p = 0.653 for 
Dominance2 and r = 0.051; p = 0.552 for Dominance3), 
suggesting that our dominance scores were not due to 
certain practices of the firm. Furthermore, we identified 
in our sample the CEOs which have served already as a 
CEO in another public company included in our sample. 
This yielded 3 CEOs; each one of them had very similar 
scores for their tenures in both companies: CEO1 (for 
Dominance1): 0.41 and 0.38, CEO2: 0.43 and 0.46, and 
CEO3: 0.51 and 0.56. This small number picture shows a 
high degree of consistency for each CEO across succes-
sive CEO positions. This pattern together with pattern 
described before makes us feel confident that our meas-
ures do—per our intentions—reflect aspects of the indi-
vidual CEO personalities as opposed to characteristics of 
their firms. Further, to explore whether our dominance 
measures captures dominance or if the performance of 
the company affects how the CEOs behaves during the 
earning call we calculated for every CEO in our sample 
for which earnings calls on Thomson One were avail-
able—Dominance measures 1, 2 and 3 for every quar-
terly earning call in our panel dataset. We then calculated 
the variance of our dominance measures within a CEO 
across earning calls. This procedure yielded data on 918 
CEOs in our sample. The dominance scores for the CEOs 
showed considerable consistency (r = 0.39; p = 0.00 for 
Dominance1; r = 0.33; p = 0.000 for Dominance2 and 
r = 0.36; p = 0.000 for Dominance3) suggesting that our 
dominance scores were not due to the performance of 
the firm.
To test the construct validity of our dominance measure, 
we asked two research assistants to independently rate 
the degree of dominance for a subset of the CEOs in our 
sample. The research assistants were instructed in detail 
about the characteristics of earnings calls, the definition 
of dominance, and how it influences a person’s commu-
nication style. Importantly, the research assistants did not 
receive any information about our three measures. The 
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assistants were then asked to read through the earnings 
calls and to rate the degree of dominance of each CEO on 
a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not dominant at all) to 7 
(highly dominant). To keep the task manageable we asked 
them to rate 50 randomly chosen CEOs from our sam-
ple. The correlation between the two raters of r = 0.326 
(p = 0.021) indicates a significant (albeit moderate) level 
of agreement between them. Furthermore, the correla-
tion between the standardized average over two raters 
and Dominance1 was r = 0.53 (p = 0.0001) and r = 0.475 
(p = 0.0005) for Dominance2. This strongly indicates that 
the perceptions of our trained assistants correspond to 
our measures of dominance and provides corroborative 
evidence that our measures indeed capture the extent to 
which CEOs exhibit a dominant personality.
Construct relevance and distinctiveness Fourth and 
finally, considering the predominant focus on CEO narcis-
sism in earlier works, scholars may wonder whether what we 
know from those previous studies renders our investigations 
obsolete. In particular, this might be the case if narcissism 
and dominance systematically co-occurred and if CEO nar-
cissism exhibited effects on organizational structure similar 
to those exerted by dominance. To rule out this alternative, 
we collected additional data. Notably, drawing on the promi-
nence of CEO photographs in annual reports, and following 
earlier research using this measure of narcissism (see, e.g., 
Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 2011; Gerstner et al. 2013; 
Petrenko et al. 2015), we coded the degree of narcissism 
among the CEOs in our sample, and we eventually reran our 
tests substituting our dominance measures for narcissism 
variables. As already indicated by the low (and insignificant) 
correlation we obtain between dominance and narcissism 
(r = 0.04 with p = 0.562), the alternative econometric tests 
relating span of control or COO appointment to narcissism 
yielded no significant results, in turn stressing the unique-
ness and originality of our proposed relationship between 
organizational structure and dominance.
Discussion and further research
In this paper, we set out to establish a link between CEOs’ 
idiosyncratic personality traits and two fundamental organi-
zational design decisions: the breadth of a CEO’s personal 
span of control and the existence of a COO position. In par-
ticular, we hypothesized that CEOs who are high in trait 
dominance will have a larger span of control and will be 
less likely than their less-dominant peers to appoint a COO 
to their top management team. To test our hypotheses, we 
computed three novel measures of CEO trait dominance 
based on quarterly earnings calls with analysts and related 
them to the span of control and COO appointments. Despite 
all residual imperfections that characterize our study, just 
as with most other empirical investigations, we believe that 
our results obtained on a sample of 186 CEOs of large US 
companies strongly support these hypotheses. As such, our 
study makes several important contributions for different 
communities of colleagues.
Scholars investigating organizational design as a source 
of sustainable competitive advantage (Aghion et al. 2014; 
Bloom and Van Reenen 2007, 2010; Bloom et al. 2012; 
Bresnahan et al. 2002; Collins et al. 1999; Colombo and Del-
mastro 1999, 2008; Csaszar 2012; Lin and Germain 2003; 
March and Simon 1993; Vázquez 2004) may see value in our 
investigation of a hitherto unexplored antecedent to variation 
in firm structure—the CEO’s dominance trait. Our results 
are particular relevant in the light of recent research on the 
flattening of firms (i.e., the delayering of hierarchies). This 
work has shown that the purported benefits of flattening—
and the resulting increase in the CEO’s span of control—
intended to push decision rights downwards to enhance 
market responsiveness (e.g., Guadalupe et al. 2013; Wulf 
2012) lack manifestation: as prior work suggests, flattened 
firms seemingly counterintuitively have more control and 
decision-making power at the top than more-hierarchical 
organizations. Our findings are suited to reconcile this 
seeming contradiction. Notably, as we suggest, CEOs may 
simultaneously increase their span of control and retain 
more decision-making authority by not appointing a COO. 
In general our findings are also in line with recent results 
of laboratory experiments (Bartling et al. 2014; Fehr et al. 
2013) evidencing a behavioral bias in individuals toward not 
delegating decision rights to others—even when it would be 
in their pecuniary interest. Our results indicate that a reluc-
tance to delegate decisions might indeed be a very relevant 
empirical phenomenon that affects important organizational 
design decisions by senior leaders and is driven by the lead-
ers’ idiosyncratic personality traits.
Moreover, our findings contribute to the literature on CEO 
personality traits and upper-echelon theory more generally 
(see, e.g., Finkelstein et al. 2009). In particular, whereas 
prior work has established the effects of CEO personality 
on strategic decisions such as acquisitions (Malmendier and 
Tate 2005, 2008), investments in R&D (Chatterjee and Ham-
brick 2007, 2011), and new product development (Nadkarni 
and Chen 2014), we show that CEO dominance, a hitherto 
unexplored fundamental personality trait, affects even one of 
the most fundamental aspects of organizations: their formal 
structure.
Finally, the results of our study might also be of value to 
management practitioners. Boards of directors, for exam-
ple, who are tasked with supervising and controlling senior 
management may lean on our analysis of CEOs’ interac-
tions with their subordinates or professional analysts to 
detect unusually high levels of CEO dominance that could 
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engender personally motivated decision-making within the 
organizations they are responsible for.
Naturally, our work leaves us with more questions than 
answers. Several of these questions stem from inherent 
limitations in our initial study on dominance and organi-
zational structure—limitations that represent avenues for 
future research. In the following, we briefly discuss those 
that seemed most important to us. For one thing, we do 
not directly explore the link between CEO dominance and 
organizational performance. Thus we are not able to assess 
whether dominance in CEOs is indeed an undesirable qual-
ity, or when. In particular, it is conceivable that firms, under 
certain conditions, may benefit from large spans of control 
or the absence of a COO, or both. In such cases, boards 
may intentionally attempt to hire dominant CEOs who might 
be the most comfortable with such an organizational struc-
ture, and the implicit (albeit never testable) causality in our 
sample might be reversed. Addressing this question would 
require future researchers to craft designs that can unam-
biguously link corporate performance to CEO personality, 
an endeavor we could not embark on for lack of the needed 
panel data to credibly address performance questions.
Further, another important limitation of our study is the 
fact that we don’t have data on the actual delegation of deci-
sion rights to subordinates such as the COO and it is not pos-
sible for us to check with our data whether the CEO inter-
venes in delegated decisions. While we argue that the COO 
is an appropriate proxy for the delegation of decisions rights 
future research should strive to measure what decisions still 
remain in the hands of the CEO.
Additionally, organizational design decision are not made 
in isolation, thus a change in one level can also have an effect 
on other hierarchy levels. Controlling for this would require 
data on the depth of the organizational hierarchy, which we 
do not have for our current study.
Lastly, we believe that there is a strong research potential 
studying dominance in CEOs more frequently. Specifically, 
the characteristics of having a desire for social control and 
the protection of their powerful positions should affect their 
preferences for keeping the status quo in firms and thus 
should also affect other organizational outcomes such as 
R&D investments, Acquisitions, or Divestitures.
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